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Country Conditions Documentation in U.S.
Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary
Playing Field
SUSAN K. KERNS*
INTRODUCTION
Documentation related to a country's political situation and human rights
record is relevant, and often crucial, evidence regarding the objective
reasonableness of an asylum seeker's subjective fear of persecution.,
Immigration decision-makers in the United States may rely on a variety of
sources for such "country conditions" evidence.2 No mechanism exists,
however, to assure fundamental fairness in how country conditions
information is utilized in the decision-making process.'
United States immigration courts have tended to rely selectively, without
reasoned analysis, on information bits that are decontextualized from what is
known about a country of origin from the record as a whole." In extreme
cases, asylum has been denied by the Immigration Judge (U) and Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) on the basis of U.S. State Department
assessments that are conclusory, driven by foreign policy concerns, and
contradicted by information appearing in the State Department's own reports.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.S.W., 1989, Indiana
University School of Social Work-Indianapolis; B.A., 1980, Colorado State University. The author wishes
to thank Professor John A. Scanlan for his direction and assistance in the preparation of this Note.
I. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, U.N. Dec. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev. 1, 42 (1992) (hereinafter
UNHCR HANDBOOK]; DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAWOF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 107-08 (3d ed. 1999).
2. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2000) (identifying permissible sources to include the State Department,
Office of International Affairs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), as well as "other credible
sources, such as international organizations, private voluntary agencies, news organizations, or academic
institutions"); In re S-M-J-, Interim Dec. 3303, 1997 WL 80984, at *7 (B.I.A. Jan. 31, 1997), disapproved
of on other grounds by, Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting the INS Basic Law
Manual that "[tlhe asylum officer should be fully familiar with the reports and country profiles developed
by the INS Resource Information Center, with the Department of State's Country Reports of Human Rights
Practices for the country being considered and with reports from Amnesty International and other reputable
organizations, including academic institutions").
3. See ANKER, supra note 1, at 108-09.
4. See Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U. COLO. L
REv. 3 (2000).
5. See id. See. e.g., Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
198 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 8:197
Such distortions of the evidentiary record go unchecked by an extraordinarily
deferential standard ofjudicial review.6 In this manner, an applicant's burden
of proof is effectively raised notwithstanding contrary statutes and Supreme
Court precedents.7 Additionally, the risk of erroneous return of bona fide
refugees is increased in violation of international obligations
Administrative and judicial practices must be changed to promote fairness
in the use of country conditions information and to reduce the risk of
erroneous return.9 First, regulatory guidelines should be adopted that ensure
that only reliable country conditions evidence is used to evaluate the
reasonableness of an applicant's fear of persecution. Specifically,
administrative adjudicators should be required to account for the nature of
country conditions information relied upon and how that information related
to the record as a whole. Second, the scope and standard of review by the
federal courts of appeals must be modified to provide a meaningful check on
6. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (construing the old substantial evidence
standard of review extremely narrowly to require upholding BIA determinations unless evidence in the
record compels reversal); Margulies, supra note 4, at 17. This extremely deferential standard of review was
codified as part of the 1996 amendments to Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4XB) (2000) (Administrative findings
of fact must be conclusive "unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.").
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 (1987); In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439,445 (B.I.A. 1987); Margulies,
supra note 4, at 18 ("The trend in proof of changed country conditions is to require greater specificity and
certainty of the asylum-seeker, and less specificity and certainty of the government. The problem is that
this trend ignores the values underlying crucial precedents such as Cardoza-Fonseca and Mogharrabi.").
8. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 196. Asylum decisions are also made vulnerable to
politicization despite recognition that asylum determinations are to be "ideologically and geographically
neutral." Joan Fitzpatrick & Robert Pauw, Foreign Policy Asylum and Discretion, 28 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 751, 752 (1992). See American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F.Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (stating the acknowledgment by INS that foreign policy considerations are not relevant to the
well-founded fear question); In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 476 (B.I.A. 1987) (Heilman, J., concurring)
("The asylum provisions are humanitarian in their essence and indeed recognize that the forces which impel
persons to seek refuge may be so overwhelming that the 'normal' immigration laws cannot be applied in
their usual manner.") (citing the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into
force April 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, as incorporated into the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
entered into force October 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter Convention)).
9. Country conditions evidence is also relevant to applications for restriction on removal (formerly
withholding of deportation) or relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. However, the focus of this paper is on ordinary
asylum claims where the burden of proof is lowest and the greatest number of applicants have the
opportunity to receive both refugee status and an opportunity to later apply for permanent residence. For
a discussion ofevidentiary issues related to restriction on removal and the Torture Convention, see ANKER,
supra note I, at 77-86, 513-18.
COUNTRY CONDITIONS DOCUMENTATION
administrative action. Judicial review should return to a "substantial
evidence" standard as interpreted by "normal principles of administrative law
governing the role of courts of appeals when reviewing agency decisions""0
to help ensure that protection is extended to bona fide refugees.
I. COUNTRY CONDITIONS EVIDENCE IN U.S. ASYLUM CASES
Applicants for asylum in the United States must prove either that they
have a well-founded fear of future persecution in their country of origin or
that they are victims of past persecution." In the latter situation, applicants
may also have to rebut a showing by the government that conditions in their
country of origin have changed such that a well-founded fear of persecution
no longer exists.' 2 A "well-founded fear" is one that is both subjectively
genuine and objectively reasonable. 3 Thus, applicants' claims "cannot...
be considered in the abstract, and must be viewed in the context of the
relevant background situation."' 4  This section explores how country
conditions information informs the contextual assessment of asylum claims
throughout the formal adjudicatory process.
A. Immigration Court Adjudication
Applicant testimony alone is ostensibly sufficient to establish a
"well-founded fear of persecution." (i.e., that a reasonable person in the
applicant's circumstances would fear persecution on account of his or her
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
10. Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994).
11. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (aX42XA), 1158(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999). For a discussion of what actions
may constitute persecution, see ANKER, supra note I, at 171-266.
12. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(bXI )(i), 208.16(bX2) (2000). Applicants who can establish that actual
persecution occurred in the past on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group are presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1) (2000). To defeat asylum eligibility, the INS must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that country conditions have changed such that there is no longer a well-founded fear of return. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(IXi) (2000).
13. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that an asylum applicant
has established "a well-founded fear ... if a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear
persecution"); UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 38 (noting that the applicant's subjective state of mind
must be supported by an objective situation).
14. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 42.
2000]
200 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 8:197
social group). 5 Moreover, applicant testimony is not presumed to be
unreliable 6 and is capable of proving the objective facts necessary to meet the
burden of proof. ' 7 Corroboration, however, is required for any part of the
asylum claim that can reasonably be verified using external evidence,
including general background information about a country's political situation
and human rights recoi'd.' 8 Country conditions evidence must be included in
the record, or its absence must reasonably be explained, when those
conditions are central to the claim. 9 Information about country conditions
principally affects asylum claims in the assessment of credibility and the
sufficiency of proof of asylum eligibility."
15. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 445 ("The alien's own testimony may in some cases be
the only evidence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently
detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis of his fear."); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000)
("The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without
corroboration."). See generally ANKER, supra note 1, at 95-96 nn.48-50 (detailing BIA and federal court
affirmations of the general rule that applicant testimony need not be corroborated if it meets the criteria
identified in In re Mogharrabi).
16. See Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76,79 (4th Cir. 1989); In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at * 11 (B.I.A.
Jan. 31, 1997) (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, concurring), disapproved ofon other grounds by, Ladha v. INS,
215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000); UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 1, I 199, 203.
17. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (ruling that the applicant's burden of proof
is more generous than a clear probability standard, and indicating with approval a one in ten chance of
persecution might be sufficient to establish reasonable fear); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (2000) (requiring the
applicant to demonstrate a "reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he or she were to return
to that country"). See also Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
that an applicant's testimony is capable of proving objective facts). See generally ANKER, supra note 1,
at 98-99 nn.63-65 (discussing the sufficiency of applicant testimony).
18. See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *1, *4-*5; In re Dass, 20 1. & N. Dec. 120, 126 (B.I.A.
1989). Given the availability of country reports from the State Department and a number of well-respected
nongovernmental sources on the Internet, arguments as to why no such information is submitted may not
be convincing-particularly for applicants who are represented by counsel. Cf. In re B-B-, Interim Dec.
3367, 1998 WL 694640, at *3 (B.I.A. Sept. 24, 1998) (holding that an applicant's attorney's refusal to
submit an asylum claim without corroboration did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because
of the attorney's obligation not to bring frivolous claims). But see Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d at 901
(disapproving of In re S-M-J- to the extent it establishes a corroboration requirement for credible applicant
testimony in the 9th Circuit).
19. See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *3.
20. The line between credibility and sufficiency of proof is not always clear. Often a determination
that an applicant's proof was insufficient to establish asylum eligibility seems to stem from credibility
concerns. See, e.g., In re Y-B-, Interim Dec. 3337, 1998 WL 99554, at *9 (B.I.A. Feb. 19, 1998)
(Rosenberg, Bd. Member, dissenting) (taking issue with a denied claim of African-Mauritanian for failure
to document a two-year stay in a Sengalese refugee camp despite evidence of U.N. problems providing such
documentation, strong supportive country conditions evidence, and no adverse credibility finding); In re
M-D-, Interim Dec. 3339, 1998 WL 127881, at *8 (B.I.A. Mar. 13, 1998) (Schmidt, Bd. Chairman,
dissenting) (alleging majority denied claim with same findings as In re Y-B- because it was really
concerned that the applicant was Senegalese posing as a Mauritanian refugee). See also Cordon-Garcia v.
INS, 204 F.3d 985,993-94 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding claimbecause applicant's evidence was discounted
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1. Credibility Determinations
Both the subjective and objective components of the well-founded fear
determination "depend heavily on the credibility of the applicant and the
applicant's evidence."'" Although the regulations no longer specifically
address the credibility assessment of an applicant's testimony against general
country conditions,22 the BIA requires the IJ to explain what background
information factored into the decision or how testimony credibility was
ascertained apart from such information.23 Country conditions evidence that
conflicts with applicant testimony can support an adverse credibility finding.24
2. Sufficiency of Proof
Evidence of generally oppressive conditions in the country of origin is
by itself insufficient to show that the individual applicant is at particular risk
on account of a protected characteristic or belief.2" Country conditions
without an adverse credibility finding).
21. Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34,43 (1st Cir. 1998). See ANKER, supra note 1, at 151 ("To the extent
it is available, country condition[s] evidence is relevant to the credibility assessment; it can provide context
for the applicant's testimony regarding specific events, harm that she suffered, or the reasons for her
particular fear of return.").
22. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(aX2000). Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)(1995) ("[Tihe testimony of the
applicant, if credible in light of general conditions in the applicant's country of nationality or last habitual
residence, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.").
23. See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *6. Inconsistencies in the applicant's testimony alone may
be sufficient for an adverse credibility finding. See e.g., Kabanova v. INS, 189 F.3d 461, 1999 WL
709329, at *2-*3 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 1999) (unpublished table opinion). Such inconsistencies also maybe
sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding in spite of strongly supportive country conditions
evidence. See, e.g., Malek v. INS, 198 F.3d 1016, 1018-21 (7th Cir. 2000); Bojorques-Villanueva v. INS,
194 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1999).
24. See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *6-07 ("Adverse credibility determinations are appropriately
based on inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony; and where
these circumstances exist in view of the background evidence on country conditions, it is appropriate for
an [1.] to make an adverse credibility determination on such a basis."); UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note
1, 204 ("The applicant's statement must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally
known facts.").
25. See Petrovic v. INS, 198 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000); In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *7
("[l]t may be that an applicant's testimony is plausible in light of general country conditions information,
but that it is overly general. In such a case, we would find that the applicant had failed to meet the required
burden of proof, but an adverse credibility determination would not be appropriate."); UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, 43; 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 34.02[1 0][c],
[ 10][f], at 34-50 (2000) (noting that the general nature of the applicant's proof will consist of two elements:
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documentation nonetheless helps applicants establish that certain protected
characteristics or beliefs are targeted by a persecutor. Such documentation
also helps demonstrate how the persecutor can become aware of and punish
persons with such characteristics or beliefs."
[Moreover,] when the basis of an asylum claim becomes less
focused on specific events involving the [applicant]
personally and instead is more directed to broad allegations
regarding general conditions in the... country of origin,
corroborative background evidence that establishes a
plausible context for the persecution claim (or an explanation
for the absence of such evidence) may well be essential.27
Country conditions information is particularly important in cases where
the government contends that relocation within the country of origin is
feasible,28 or where changes in country conditions precipitate an asylum
claim29 or occur during the processing of an asylum claim." These cases
evidence of generally oppressive characteristics of the country of origin and the specific basis for the
applicant's fear).
26. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439, 446-47 (B.I.A. 1987); In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984,
at *4 ("Where the country at issue in an asylum case has a history of persecuting people in circumstances
similar to the asylum applicant's.., we also expect general corroborating evidence, from a reliable source,
of persecution of persons in circumstances similar to an applicant where such information is reasonably
available."); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(bX2Xii) (2000) (allowing for similarly situated claims).
27. InreDass, 201.&N. Dec. 120,125 (B.I.A. 1989).
28. See, e.g., Singh v. llchert, 69 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the possibility of
internal relocation weighs against a discretionary grant of asylum to an otherwise eligible applicant). See
generally ANKER, supra note 1, at 55-67 (discussing a requirement of countrywide threat where the
persecution appears highly localized or the agent of persecution is nongovernmental).
29. Persons who do not flee the country of origin in fear of persecution may become refugees sur
place because of events occurring in the country of origin after their departure. See UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note i, 94; ANKER, supra note 1, at 3540.
30. "[T]iming of the changes with respect to the claim process can have a significant impact on the
success of a claimant's application. If the change occurs during the initial evaluation of the claim, the
applicant has the opportunity to present evidence to show that the changes have not negated his or her claim
to refugee status.... [lf changes in country conditions occur after a refugee has been granted asylum, the
government must hold a hearing before it may conclude that circumstances have changed significantly
enough that the refugee no longer needs asylum protection and may be sent home. If, however, the changes
... occur after the initial hearing, but while a claim is still pending on appeal ... , the [BIA may] ...
simply [ ] take 'official notice' of the change in country conditions as a basis for denying the appeal ....
Once denied asylum, the claimant's only recourse is to file a 'motion to reopen' the case before the BIA.
However, these motions are granted at the BLA's discretion and denials are afforded highly deferential
judicial review." Katherine J. Strandburg, Official Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum
Adjudication: Lessons from International Refugee Law, II GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45,45-46 (1996) (footnotes
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often involve past persecution claims where the government attempts to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions in the country
of origin have sufficiently changed so that the adjudicator can no longer
presume that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution."
Although applicants bear the burden of proof, asylum law recognizes the
unique difficulties of proof associated with "the circumstances of refugee
flight, exile, and trauma. " " This recognition not only translates into a
"unique and reduced standard of proof,"3 but also into what has been
described as a "duty to inquire." '34 The BIA has interpreted this duty to mean
that both the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and IJ share
responsibility with the applicant for creating a record that affords an adequate
basis of review for the BIA and federal courts of appeals. 5 This shared
responsibility extends to the introduction of current country conditions
evidence given that such information represents a "reasonable adjudicatory
aid intended to facilitate a reasoned and fair decision." '36 As a general matter,
this responsibility appears to be satisfied merely by INS submission of current
country reports and advisory opinions from the State Department.37 While the
omitted). See generally ANKER, supra note 1, at 137-150 (discussing substantive criteria for analyzing
changes in country conditions and noting that the BIA has not adopted a systematic approach to evaluating
such changes).
31. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), (b)(l)(i) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(bX2) (2000).
32. ANKER, supra note I, at 20.
33. Id. See, e.g.. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
34. Strandburg, supra note 30, at 47. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 1, I 196, 205(bXi).
35. See In re S-M-J-, Interim Dec. 3303, 1997 WL 80984, at *7, *10 (B.I.A. Jan. 31, 1997),
disapproved of on other grounds by, Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000).
36. Id. at * 13 (Rosenberg, Bd. Mem., concurring) (noting also that such shared obligations are
particularly appropriate in "asylum adjudications, where we are carrying out international obligations, as
codified by Congress, to provide refuge to those facing actual or feared persecution"). See also David A.
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247,
1284-85 (1990) (noting that an adjudicator's knowledge of country conditions can play a useful role in
developing and assessing applicant testimony). "[It] is not just a device for spotting weaknesses or
magnifying contradictions. Properly applied, it can also assist confused or inarticulate applicants in
presenting fully the particularized information that will cast positive light on their claims." Id.
37. See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *5. Regulations require the INS to forward asylum
applications to the State Department for its input on the claim, and asylum officers or Us may request
specific comment on a pending claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (a), (c) (2000). The State Department has the
option of providing any information it deems relevant, including general country conditions information
and a particularized assessment of the applicant's claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (b)(l)-(3). BIA Board
Member Rosenberg would envision the government's responsibility more broadly in light of international
obligations under the Refugee Convention: "I view the Service's responsibility in these proceedings to
require not only the production of evidence pertaining to general country conditions, but to require that the
Service provide any other evidence, either within its possession or readily accessible, which supports the
contentions made by the applicant." In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *15 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member,
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IJ may bear some responsibility in helping the applicant understand what
additional evidence would be necessary to support the claim, in practice the
IJ need only "to explain assumptions or conclusions regarding such conditions
that form the basis of his decision" so that the BIA can conduct a meaningful
review.3
B. Administrative Review
The BIA has the authority to exercise independent judgment in a de novo
review of U decisions.3 In practice, BIA review is often narrowly restricted
to the record created by the IJ.4° Immigration Judge findings are often upheld
even when "another outcome might have been justified on the record,"'
particularly with regard to credibility findings.42 Moreover, reviews are
approached in such a case-specific manner that little guidance exists as to
what applicants must do to establish a successful claim.43 Decisions by the
BIA where country conditions evidence was a decisive issue similarly provide
little concrete guidance as to its use in asylum claims. The Board has only
established that reliable country conditions evidence is often a necessary
adjunct to credibility assessments and establishment of "similarly situated"
claims." If conditions in the country of origin have changed after the initial
hearing, the BIA may take official notice of such changes and use those
changes as the basis for denying the appeal.4"
concurring).
38. ANKER, supra note 1, at 159; See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *6.
39. SeeS C.F.R. § 3.1 (d)(l) (2000); see also In re A-S-, Interim Dec. 3336, 1998 WL 99553, at
3 (B.I.A. 1998) (Schmidt, Bd. Chairman, dissenting) ("It is axiomatic that the Board has the authority to
employ a de novo standard of appellate review in deciding the ultimate disposition of a case.").
40. See e.g., In re Godfrey, 13 1. & N. Dec. 790 (B.I.A. 197 1); "The Board hears no testimony and
ordinarily limits its review to matters developed in the record. In some exceptional cases the Board has
accepted and considered additional affidavits or other documents." GORDON ET AL., supra note 25, §
3.05[5][b], at 54-55. See Strandburg, infra note 45 (discussing the practice of "official notice").
41. In reA-S-, 1998 WL 99553, at "8,* 9 (Schmidt, Bd. Chairman, dissenting).
42. See id. at *3.
43. ANKER, supra note 1, at 8 (noting also that BIA issues only a small proportion of precedent
opinions, the majority of which are denials).
44. See In re S-M-J-, Interim Dec. 3303,1997 WL 80984, at *10 (B.I.A. Jan. 31,1997), disapproved
of on other grounds by, Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 1U could not rely
on assumptions about the applicant's country of origin where the only country conditions evidence in the
record was a State Department country report for the wrong country); In re Dass, In re Dass, 20 1. & N. Dec.
120, 125 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that country conditions evidence may be essential for claims rooted less
in individual experience than the general human rights record of the country of origin).
45. "Official notice" (also called "administrative notice") is similar to "judicial notice," and "is a
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The BIA has provided no explicit guidance for assessing the evidentiary
weight of differing pieces of country conditions information, even though
these "pieces" may appear in a single document or several documents, be
derived from one or more sources, and vary in degrees of specificity and
reliability.46 While assumptions about the background conditions of the
country of origin cannot be made without pointing to some country conditions
evidence from a reliable source in the record,47 other arguably material
country conditions evidence can be ignored without reason.' Additionally,
reliance on conclusory assessments of the risk of persecution may be
sufficient evidence to support a denial of asylum eligibility without any
requirement that such assessments be evaluated within the context of country
conditions evidence taken as a whole. 9
procedure the BIA uses to bring changed country conditions into its deliberations without the adversarial
presentation of evidence on the subject." Strandburg,.supra note 30, at 45. Noticed facts are supposed to
be matters of public knowledge from reliable sources that will not deny individual adjudication. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(i) (2000). However, the BIA not only takes official notice of facts like the
establishment of a new government, but it also takes notice of more sweeping judgments about the
implications of a change in power without giving the applicant an opportunity to rebut. See ANKER, supra
note 1, at 112 & n. 135, 118. The constitutionality of administrative notice has not been resolved by the
Supreme Court, but it has been approved by several courts which view the discretionary motion to reopen
as sufficient opportunity for the applicant to rebut. Compare Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.
1991), with Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992). However, "the filing of a motion to
reopen does not automatically stay the deportation process.... Thus, there is no assurance that a claimant's
valid objections to the BIA's interpretation of events in his or her native land will be heard in time to
prevent deportation." Strandburg, supra note 30, at 45-46. For a thorough discussion of official notice of
country conditions information, see ANKER, supra note 1, at 112-50.
46. See Margulies, supra note 4, at 34 ("State Department reports are wholly unsystematic in their
approach. At best, these reports amount to a grab bag of facts offering little insight into the risks faced by
returning refugees. At worst, they offer an apologia for human rights abuses that is driven by U.S. foreign
policy concerns rather than the safety of refugees.").
47. See e.g., In re C-Y-Z-, Interim Dec. 3319, 1997 WL 353222, at *5 (B.I.A. June 4, 1997)
(holding that INS must submit evidence of changed country conditions to rebut presumption of future
persecution where past persecution has been proven by the applicant).
48. See. e.g., Petrovic v. INS, 198 F.3d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The BIA is not required to
independently specify its reasons for rejecting every piece of evidence it is offered."); In re E-P-, Interim
Dec. 3311, 1997 WL 123905, at *3-*4 (B.I.A. Mar. 14, 1997) (relying on a State Department assessment
that the Haitian government is becoming "increasingly stable" to support a denial of a claim and to ignore
other State Department and nongovernmental evidence of continuing threats from paramilitary structures).
But see Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 46 (1 st Cir. 1998) (remanding under a substantial evidence standard
of review for the BIA to adequately explain why countervailing information that goes to the heart of an
asylum claim was not credible or persuasive); In re O-Z- & I-Z-, Interim Dec. 3346, 1998 WL 177674, at
*4 (B.I.A. Apr. 2, 1998) (three member panel holding that a statement in a State Department country report
that anti-Semitism ceased to be government policy was insufficient in a past persecution case when the
report contained other statements about local authorities remaining unresponsive to ethnic violence).
49. See, e.g., Kumar v. INS, 204 F.3d 931,934 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming a denial of asylum under
the compelling evidence standard where the BIA and IJ relied on a State Department conclusion that human
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C. Federal Court Review
Appeals of BIA decisions may be heard by the federal courts of appeals,5"
which historically "review the administrative decisions under varying
standards for issues of law, fact and discretion."'" As a general rule, however,
BIA findings that asylum applicants have not established a well-founded fear
of persecution are reviewed by the federal courts of appeals with extreme
deference.52 The administrative record provides the sole basis on which
review is conducted," and the ineligibility determination is "conclusive unless
manifestly contrary to law." 4 Moreover, underlying findings of fact, such as
the objective reasonableness of the applicant's fears in light of country
conditions, "are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary."" This extremely narrow scope of
rights abuses were no longer widespread and ignored countervailing country conditions evidence in the
record); In re A-E-M-, Interim Dec. 3338, 1998 WL 99555, at *4 (B.I.A. Feb. 20, 1998) (relying on an
estimate of a fifty percent reduction in murders by a paramilitary group and ignoring evidence of specific
incidents of persons being targeted for violence by the group); In re T-M-B-, Interim Dec. 3307, 1997 WL
80988, at *4-*5 (B.I.A. Feb. 20, 1997) (relying on an estimate that guerrillas controlled only two percent
of provinces while ignoring evidence that this area included the country's only major population center).
'But see Duarte De Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Had the Board engaged in the
'individualized analysis' ofcountry-conditions... it would have been compelled to find [that] ... the INS's
evidence, taken as a whole, supports, rather than controverts, Guinac's application for asylum.").
50. The availability of judicial review for asylum claims by some applicants has been significantly
eroded since the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208. See 8 U.S.C. § § 1158(b)(2)(D), 1252(aX2)(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (barring judicial
review of administrative determinations of asylum ineligibility due to suspected terrorist activities and
commission of certain criminal offenses).
51. ANKER, supra note 1, at 8.
52. The current statute governing the scope and standard of review, see infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text, reflects the extremely narrow construction of 8 U.S.C. § I105a(a)(4) (1990)
(articulating the standard as "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as
a whole"). See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) still applies to
cases initiated prior to the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified in
Title 8 of the United States Code.
53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (allowing remand for a defective or
incomplete record). Many commentators question the adequacy of the administrative record for judicial
review where official notice has been taken of changed country conditions. See Strandburg, supra note 30,
at 68. In those cases, the record is devoid of the applicant's perspective of the effect of changes on his
refugee status. See id. This inadequacy also can be seen to represent a breach of the adjudicator's duty to
assist applicants in establishing their cases. See id. at 69.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(C) (1994 & Supp. 1999). The Attorney General's discretion to deny
asylum to an otherwise eligible applicant is reversed only upon a finding that the refusal is manifestly
contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4XD) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1999). See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th
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review forecloses virtually any evaluation of the agency's treatment of
country conditions evidence. 6
II. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE? ABDICATION OF ADJUDICATORY
RESPONSIBILITY AND INCREASED RISK OF ERRONEOUS RETURN OF BONA
FIDE REFUGEES
United States asylum law codifies an international obligation to ensure
that bona fide refugees are not returned to a country where they might suffer
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group." Undoubtedly, adjudicators face a
formidible task when assessing the validity of claims for asylum and
predicting the possible consequences of returning applicants to their country
of origin. 8 These cases are typically rife with uncertainty-key events are
removed in time, geography, and culture; information about what has
occurred is limited and possibly distorted by the different social norms of
adjudicators and asylum-seekers; and, any evidence put forth by applicants
may appear self-serving given their obvious desire to remain in the United
States.59 Uncertainty also plagues the issue of country conditions. The future
course of political and social events is far from certain, and the complex
interplay of formal and informal societal processes may give rise to both an
improved human rights record and, yet, a continuing risk of persecution for
a particular individual.' Additionally, interpretations of events in the country
Cir. 1998) ("Our task is to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the BIA's finding,
not to substitute an analysis of which side in the factual debate we find more persuasive.").
56. See, e.g., Petrovic, 198 F.3d at 1037; Kumar, 204 F.3d at 934. Courts have occasionally taken
issue with the selective use of country conditions evidence to deny asylum claims. These cases, however,
generally involved past persecutions where the burden of proof was on the government, and less deferential
constructions of the pre-1996 "substantial evidence" standard of review were used rather than the
Elias-Zacarias (and now statutory) standard of "compelling evidence." See, e.g., Duarte De Guinac, 179
F.3d at 1163; Gailius, 147 F.3d at 44; Ghebllawi v. INS, 28 F.3d 83, 85 (9th Cir. 1994).
57. See In re S-M-J-, Interim Dec. 3303, 1997 WL 80984, at *2 (B.I.A. Jan. 31, 1997) (observing
that the B.I.A., 1J, and INS all bear the responsibility of ensuring that refugee protection is provided to
applicants who meet the lesser standard of proof established for asylum eligibility in the Refugee Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 8 of the
United States Code)); ANKER, supra note I, at 2-3.
58. Martin, supra note 36, at 1280 (roting that asylum adjudication requires a sophisticated and
difficult inquiry involving both retrospective factfinding and informed prediction).
59. See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at 011 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, concurring); Margulies,
supra note 4, at 12-13.
60. See Margulies, supra note 4, at 12-13.
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of origin by governmental and nongovernmental organizations may be
influenced by broader political considerations."'
Asylum determinations thus inherently depend on largely unverifiable
assertions, and asylum seekers face enormous problems of proof when
substantiating their claims.62 Acknowledging that these difficulties could lead
to the erroneous return of bona fide refugees, asylum law doctrines were
developed which differ significantly from general immigration law.
Decisions are supposed to be insulated from foreign policy considerations,
presumptions of credibility and sufficiency are to be applied to applicant
testimony, and a uniquely low burden of proof is to be required of
applicants. 3 This Part explores how these unique protections for asylum
applicants are eroded by administrative adjudications, unchecked by the
federal judiciary, that uncritically and selectively rely on country conditions
information.
A. Administrative Abdication of Factfinding -- Distorting the Evidentiary
Record and Raising Applicants 'Burden of Proof.
Asylum claims require adjudicators to make three distinct, but
interrelated, determinations." Retrospective factfinding about past events
specific to the claimant are combined with broader determinations about
current country conditions to make an informed prediction about the type and
degree of danger an applicant might face if returned to the country of origin. 5
61. See, e.g.. Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting concerns that the State
Department downplays human rights' violations by governments with which it wants to have friendly
relations); M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304,313 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[Wle do not wish to disparage the
work of private investigative bodies in exposing inhumane practices, [but] these organizations may have
their own agendas and concerns, and their condemnations are virtually omnipresent."). See generally GIL
LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR,
1945 TO THE PRESENT 68-101 (1986) (discussing the historical influence of foreign policy in asylum
determinations).
62. See In re S-M-J-, 1997 WL 80984, at *14-*15 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, concurring); UNHCR
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, I1 196-97, 203.
63. See discussion infra Part ll(A) and accompanying notes; Fitzpatrick & Pauw, supra note 8, at
758 (noting several changes in asylum practice that were expected to reduce the role of ideology in asylum
determinations, including: professionalizing asylum officers, creating the Resource Information Center,
allowing the INS and the State Department to rely on nongovernmental sources of country conditions
information, and making State Department comments on individual applications optional rather than
mandatory).
64. See Martin, supra note 36, at 1280-85.
65. See id.
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To make these determinations, the adjudicator must conscientiously assess the
facts developed at the hearing-facts that may be characterized as either
adjudicative or legislative in nature.66 For the purposes of this analysis, facts
can be considered "adjudicatory" in nature if they relate to the parties and
disputed issues to be resolved by the adjudicator. Examples of adjudicatory
facts include what happened to the applicant while living in the country of
origin, and what will likely happen to him if he is returned. 7 General or
specific facts regarding country conditions not directly in dispute may be
considered legislative in nature. Examples of these facts include current laws
on the books in the country of origin, recent election results, and reported
numbers and types of human rights abuses.6" Accordingly, legislative facts
in this analysis are essential to the evaluation and understanding of
adjudicative facts regarding country conditions, and neither can be considered
in isolation from the particulars of an individual's situation.69
Frequently, the dominant source of legislative facts about a country of
origin is a country report or profile from the State Department. 70  These
66. See Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055,1062-63 (2d Cir. 1976); 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS& RJCHARD
J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.5, at 140-41 (3d ed. 1994); Martin, supra note 36, at
1285. The adjudicatory-legislative distinction is utilized in this paper purely as an analytical device. The
construction of these concepts varies somewhat from traditional formulations. See infra notes 67-68 and
accompanying text.
67. "Adjudicative facts" are construed somewhat more broadly here to include not only individual
facts about the applicant and his situation, but also debatable facts about country conditions closely related
to the merits of the claim. Compare Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1062 n.4 (citing a 1958 version of the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWTREATISE that "[aldjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities,
businesses, and properties"), and Martin, supra note 36, at 1280 (construing adjudicative facts as relating
to past events specific to the claimant), with 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 66, § 10.5, at 140-41, and
ANKER, supra note I, at 122 ("Adjudicative facts ... directly concern the parties and may determine the
outcome of the proceeding.").
68. "Legislative facts" are construed narrowly here to include only relatively provable propositions
that are almost entirely factual in nature. Excluded are propositions that are mixed with opinion, judgment,
policy or political preferences. Cf. ANKER, supra note 1, at 122 n.175 (discussing Davis' broad
categorization of legislative facts to include "facts that are debatable or closely related to the merits and
particulars of the applicant's claim"); Martin, supra note 36, at 1282 (describing legislative facts as broad
determinations about a government or other alleged persecutions in a country of origin).
69. See In re S-M-J-, Interim Dec. 3303, 1997 WL 80984, at *4 (B.I.A. Jan. 31, 1997) ("The
situation of each person, however, must be assessed.on its own merits." (quoting UNHCR HANDBOOK
43)); UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note I, 37 ("Determinations of refugee status will therefore primarily
require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than ajudgment on the situation prevailing in his
country of origin.").
70. See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have
already held that the country report from our Department of State is 'the most appropriate' and 'perhaps
the best resource'..."); Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1062 ("The obvious source of information on general
conditions in the foreign country is the Department of State which has diplomatic and consular
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documents alone may provide sufficiently varied and reliable legislative facts
derived from diverse sources to adequately inform the adjudicator about
general background conditions in the country of origin and provide substantial
support to an applicant's claim.7" Along with legislative facts, however, these
documents frequently include broad generalizations or summary assessments
of country conditions that relate to the danger of particular forms of
persecution.72 Such statements are essentially more adjudicatory than
legislative in nature because they project or speculate about the implications
of broad legislative facts (e.g., that a reduced number of overall murders by
a paramilitary group is sufficient evidence to eliminate the risk that a
particular person or group of persons will be attacked). As such, these
statements require a vigorous evaluation that considers all the legislative facts
known about the country (e.g., the number of violent incidents reportedly
perpetrated by the military in the last several years).73 Some documents, such
as State Department advisory opinions, contain assessments and conclusions
about a particular applicant's risk of persecution. These assessments
influence the adjudicator's "informed prediction"7 and are at the heart of the
asylum determination. They are also, however, often conclusory in nature and
are accordingly problematic because they prove "both too little and too
much."75  In the absence of expert rebuttal opinion,76 such conclusory
representatives throughout the world."); In re T-M-B-, Interim Dec. 3307, 1997 WL 80988, at *1 (B.I.A.
Feb. 20, 1997) ("Country profiles submitted by the Department of State. . .are entitled to considerable
deference.").
71. See, e.g., Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1086 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (quoting portions of a State
Department country report that significantly reinforced the applicant's claim); In re T-M-B-, 1997 WL
80988, at *11 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, dissenting) (pointing out that the State Department country profile
did not deny the ability of an urban guerrilla group to engage in persecution on account of a victim's
political opinion). State Department country reports now routinely incorporate information derived from
nongovernmental sources. See ANKER, supra note 1, at II I n.129 (noting also that the INS and its
Resource Information Center consider sources like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the
Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights as credible as the State Department or U.N. Special Rapporteur).
72. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 4, at 19-20.
73. See, e.g.. Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Nos. M96-10465, M96-10466,
Immigration and Refugee Board (Appeal Division) of Canada. Nov. 6, 1998 (requiring closer scrutiny of
generalizations or conclusions drawn by credible reports on human rights conditions for use in judicial
factfinding than for those reports' documentation of political events or incidents of human rights abuses)
(unpublished opinion on file with author & available at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada).
74. See Martin, supra note 36, at 1280.
75. Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1063 (noting also that such assessments tend to "give little or nothing in
the way of useful information about conditions in the foreign country. What they do is to recommend how
... the particular petitioner's request for asylum [should be decided].").
76. See. e.g., Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that an asylum
applicant "had better be able to point to a highly credible independent source of expert knowledge if he
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statements risk carrying "a weight they do not deserve"" because they may
oversimplify the relationship between political conditions, human rights
abuses, and the particular situation of the applicant.78
Given the ambiguity and complexity inherent in asylum claims,
adjudicators are understandably prone to confusion regarding the natures and
purposes of various facts. An unnecessarily narrow scope of BIA review only
perpetuates the confusion." The ability of the U and BIA to "pluck sweeping
generalizations from State Department reports to support [their] conclusions,
while ignoring specific statements in those reports that support an asylum
seekers's petition"'8 confuses adjudicative facts with legislative facts. The
use of generalizations also fails to acknowledge the different roles these facts
play when making an informed prediction about the danger of persecution.
Additionally, administrative adjudicators frequently, fail to evaluate
"adjudicative" generalizations in light of all the specific legislative facts
known about the country of origin.8' In so doing, these adjudicators abdicate
their fact-finding responsibilities.8 2 Moreover, when adjudicators rely on
wants to contradict the State Department's evaluation of the likelihood of his being persecuted if he is
forced to return home"). This kind of deference to State Department assessments requires a type and quality
of proof unavailable to the significant numbers of applicants who are either unrepresented or represented
only in a "marginal fashion." In re A-S-, Interim Dec. 3336, 1998 WL 99553, at "8 (B.I.A. Feb. 19,1998)
(Schmidt, Bd. Chairman, dissenting).
77. Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1063.
78. See Margulies, supra note 4, at 6 ("The State Department's bias on human rights issues is simply
more difficult for an adjudicator to discern behind the veneer of governmental legitimacy, authority, and
competence."); Martin, supra note 36, at 1279 ("Obviously, an important relationship exists between
human rights abuses in the home country and the merits of asylum claims by that country's nationals. But
it is hardly a one-to-one correlation.... Return pronounces no blessing on the home government's overall
practices.... Similarly, granting asylum is not inconsistent with a policy of alliance and support for a
democratically elected government.").
79. See In re A-S-, 1998 WL 99553, at *19 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, dissenting).
80. Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1086 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
81. Another practical effect of this failure is the implicit devaluing of nongovernmental sources,
including those sources widely recognized as credible and reliable that are utilized within government
reports. See Margulies, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing the traditional view of governmental sources as
inherently more "objective" and reliable sources of country conditions information). This devaluing
increases the politicization of the asylum determination. See ANKER, supra note I, at 110 n.128 and
accompanying text; Fitzpatrick & Pauw, supra note 8, at 765-68.
82. See Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1086; In re A-S-, 1998 WL 99553, at "13 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member,
dissenting). Reliance on State Department generalizations and persecution assessments represents a failure
to fulfill the adjudicator's duty to assist applicants in establishing their cases according to UNHCR
HANDBOOK 196. See id. at *19. This abdication is most dramatic in cases where the BIA has taken
official notice of changed country conditions. "BIA opinions taking official notice of changed country
conditions are usually cursory, often consisting almost entirely ofboilerplate language, and displaying little,
if any, reasoned consideration of the relevance of the change in country conditions to the specific
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conclusions about country conditions (even if well-supported by legislative
facts) without rigorous analysis of their relation to the specific facts presented
by the applicant's testimony and other evidence, they implicitly presume that
both the applicant's credibility and the sufficiency of his or her evidence is
lacking. 3 Together, these practices distort the evidentiary record and
effectively raise the applicant's burden of proof.8 4
B. Judicial Abdication of Meaningful Review ofAdministrative Agency
Actions - Increasing the Risk of Erroneous Return.
Abdication of adjudicatory responsibility and erosion of evidentiary
protections for asylum seekers go virtually unchecked by an overly deferential
standard of judicial review. The Elias-Zacarias "compelling evidence"85
standard significantly narrowed the role of judicial review in asylum
determinations, and thus made the asylum review standard considerably more
narrow than the kind of review available in other administrative contexts.86
This "hyper-deferential approach"8" effectively ratifies selective use of
country conditions evidence, ignores the unique interests and obligations at
stake in asylum determinations, and creates a formidable barrier to correcting
any erroneous denials of asylum eligibility.8
The "compelling evidence" standard of review represents an
unnecessarily rigid construction of the "substantial evidence" standard
normally applied to agency decisions involving formal hearings conducted on
record.89 "Substantial evidence" review is deferential, and courts cannot
individual's case." Strandburg, supra note.30, at 45-46.
83. See In re A-S-, 1998 WL 99553, at * 17 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, dissenting) ("As a practical
matter, a presumption, at worst of fraud and at best of inadequacy, has insinuated its way into all asylum
adjudications made by the Board. I venture to guess that such a presumption exists in many adjudications
of asylum claims conducted by Immigration Judges.").
84. Id. at*15. See In reM-D-, Interim Dec. 3339,1998 WL 127881,at 5(B.I.A. Mar. 13, 1998)
(Schmidt, Bd. Chairman, dissenting). See also Margulies, supra note 4, at 19, 24 (discussing how State
Department conclusions tend "to outweigh all but the most copiously corroborated refugee testimony...
[This] results in resolving uncertainty against the asylum-seeker, thereby creating a defacto 'likelihood of
persecution' standard, in direct contravention of Cardoza-Fonseca.").
85. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
87. Margulies, supra note 4, at 17.
88. See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1998) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
89. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XE) (1994 & Supp. 1998); 6 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL.,ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 51.02[1 ], at 51-91 (1999). But see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (declaring INA removal
procedures to be the "sole and exclusive procedure[s]" unless otherwise specified, thereby making
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reject agency decisions because they might have come to a different
conclusion.9 ° The Elias-Zacarias Court, however, applied the "substantial
evidence" standard to asylum decisions in a manner that significantly
enhanced that deference. The Court interpreted traditional administrative law
doctrine as allowing federal court rejection of agency findings only if a
reasonable factfinder would have to reach a different conclusion.9' It also
ignored reference to consideration of the "record as a whole" before
determining if a factfinder would reasonably have to reach a different
conclusion.92 Furthermore, the Elias-Zacarias Court ignored the precedent
that the courts are responsible for providing a "thorough, probing, in-depth
review" of agency decisions even under a more lenient arbitrary and
capricious standard of review.9 3 Thus, in asylum determinations, the
Elias-Zacarias decision represents an abdication of the judiciary's
responsibility to evaluate the nature of the evidence before the agency when
determining if, as a whole, it was of sufficient "relevant probative force" that
a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate support of the agency's
conclusions.94
The Elias-Zacarias Court also failed to consider that the degree of
deference required by the "substantial evidence" standard varies with the
standard of proof for a particular action.95 The nature of a given action, as
procedures under the Administrative Procedures Act inapplicable).
90. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951); STEIN ETAL, supra note 89,
§ 51.02[1], at 51-94, 51-96. Deference to agency determinations is said "to protect the integrity and
autonomy of the administrative process as well as [acknowledge] the agency's expertise and experience."
Id. § 51.01[2), at 51-79, 51-81.
91. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Cf. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S.
at 477, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) ("Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.").
92. See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 448 ("[A] reviewing court is not barred from setting
aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is
substantial when viewed in light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence
opposed to the Board's view.") (emphasis added); STEIN ET AL., supra note 89, § 51.02[ 1], at 51-119 ("A
view of the entire record means that the court must take into account evidence in the record which detracts
from evidence relied on by the agency.").
93. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415 (1971), abrogated on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
94. See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 487-88 ("The substantiality of evidence must take into
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.").
95. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96-102 (1981) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XE) to be
subject to 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557, thereby affecting the quantity of proof necessary to demonstrate that
agency action was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence).
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expressed explicitly by statute or inherently in the overall purpose of a
statutory scheme, may require that an administrative decision be supported by
more than a "scintilla of evidence."96 Indeed, "substantial evidence," in some
actions, requires "a preponderance of such reliable and probative evidence as
a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion."97
One would expect, therefore, that the asylum law standard of review
would be a less deferential construction of the "substantial evidence"
standard, given the applicant's low burden of proof and the presumptions of
credibility and sufficiency. Yet, the Elias-Zacarias Court (and, subsequently,
Congress) ignored the unique obligations and interests at stake in asylum
determinations. The "compelling evidence" construction allows BIA denials
of asylum eligibility to rest on mere conclusory statements about country
conditions - findings that neither fairly recognize countervailing country
conditions evidence,98 nor fairly assess the implications of those findings for
the particular situation of an individual applicant." Thus, the risk of
erroneous return is increased because the standard ofjudicial review does not
assure that asylum law evidentiary protections have been properly applied.
II. LEVELING THE EVIDENTIARY PLAYING FIELD: PROPOSALS FOR FAIR
USE OF COUNTRY-CONDITIONS EVIDENCE
No official barrier prevents the use of diverse sources and types of
country conditions information in asylum claim adjudications -- a prerequisite
to reliable decision-making in this context.1" Regulations permit admission
96. STEIN ET AL., supra note 89, § 51.02[1], at 51-111, 51-112.
97. Id. at 5 1- 112 (emphasis added). Moreover, under some constructions of the substantial evidence
standard, such evidence adequate to support aconclusion cannot include testimony that has been impeached
or contradicted. See Dickson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396-97 (1953); Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336,
342 (9th Cir. 1994).
98. "Countervailing country conditions evidence" can exist within a report on which an LI relies, or
that evidence can exist outside that report in other reports prepared by either governmental or
nongovernmental organizations. See supra notes 2, 46 and accompanying text.
99. See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 1998) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the compelling evidence standard applied by the majority allowed "the cursory letter of a government
bureaucrat" to defeat the presumption of well-founded fear in a past persecution case). Cf. Gailius v. INS,
147 F.3d 34, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a State Department advisory opinion did not constitute
"substantial evidence"). I
100. Many scholars agree that the best way to prevent against potential biases in this process is to use
diverse sources of country conditions information. See ANKER, supra note 1, at 110 n.126 and
accompanying text; Margulies, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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and reliance on multiple sources of information,'0 ' and the BIA itself has
noted that "[t]he more background information the Service has about the
applicant's country, the more thorough and intelligent the examination will
be."'0 2 The problem for applicants, however, is not in the admissibility of
diverse sources of country conditions evidence. Rather, the problem is that
the IJs and BIA selectively use individual pieces of country conditions
information without regard to the nature of that information or how those
"pieces"' relate to the record as a whole.'0 3
Disregard for relevant evidence, without analysis, distorts the
adjudicatory process. Reform is needed at both the administrative and
judicial levels of asylum adjudication to "level the evidentiary playing field"
and reduce the risk that bona fide refugees will be erroneously returned to
their country of origin. Towards this end, guidelines must be developed that
govern the use of country conditions information and promote fairness in how
such information informs the evaluative and predictive aspects of
decision-making."' Additionally, federal courts of appeals must employ a
"substantial evidence" standard of review that ensures agency conclusions are
reasonably grounded in the record and based on substantial evidence that
relates to the record as a whole.
A. Administrative Reform
Decisions which rely on decontextualized bits of information risk
distorting or misapprehending the evidentiary record and thereby increase the
risk that asylum will be denied to bona fide refugees. To reduce this risk of
error, the IJs and BIA must demonstrate that their decisions represent a truly'
individualized assessment of the applicant's claim on its own merits, and that
their conclusions have more than just a peripheral basis in the record.'0 5
Administrative adjudicators must engage in explicit factfinding that accounts
101. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (1999).
102. In reS-M-J-, Interim Dec. 3303, 1997 WL 80984, at "5(B.I.A. Jan. 31, 1997).
103. See In re A-S-, Interim Dec. 3336, 1998 WL 99553, at *18 (B.I.A. Feb. 19, 1998) (Rosenberg,
Bd. Member, dissenting).
104. One commentator has recommended the creation of a new Asylum Board. See Martin, supra
note 36, at 1358. Such a Board would be composed of attorneys and would constitute a separate appellate
body to allow the development of greater expertise in both asylum law and knowledge of country
conditions. Id.
105. See In re A-S-, 1998 WL 99553, at *9 (Schmidt, Bd. Chairman, dissenting) (arguing that
"reasonable results are not necessarily correct results in individual cases").
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for the differences between adjudicatory facts related to disputed issues and
legislative facts about the country of origin. Moreover, the administrative
decision must reflect a conscientious application of the two kinds of facts in
its predictive assessment about the reasonableness of an individual applicant's
fear of persecution. Proposed regulatory guidelines for achieving these ends
are discussed in turn.
1. Distinguish between legislative and adjudicatory facts, and accord
presumptive evidentiary reliability only to legislative facts
emanating from credible sources.
The country conditions information from any one source may include
statistics, explanations of formal government structures, recitation of policies
and laws on the books, reports of particular practices "on the ground"
(including detailed descriptions of particular incidents of persecution), and
conclusory statements and sweeping generalizations -- none of which can be
fully understood apart from the context of the country conditions evidence as
a whole."ta Rejecting or assigning less probative weight to some of these
pieces may be justifiable; however, articulating a basis for doing so is a
necessary factfinding function that protects against distorting the record and
skewing the evidentiary burdens. 7
The credibility of a source should not be confused with the evaluation of
the individual pieces of information that are derived from that source. The
nature of particular pieces of information and how those individual pieces
inform the decision-making process are separate considerations. Although
adjudicators cannot independently verify the accuracy of information reported
by governmental or nongovernmental sources, the credibility of the source
alone does not warrant giving dispositive weight to any individual piece of
information within a given document.' ° Identifying the nature of individual
pieces of information is a simple, but crucial, first step in the fair use of
106. See Margulies, supra note 4, at 34.
107. See id. at 36 ("[Blurdens of proof make little difference if asylum adjudicators are free to defer,
without analysis, to State Department conclusions.").
108. This issue is particularly acute when the BIA takes official notice of changed country conditions,
where applicants rarely have the opportunity to present evidence on how those changes affect their
individual situation. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of potential procedures
to minimize the due process concerns associated with official notice of changed country conditions, see
Martin, supra note 36, at 1354.
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country conditions evidence in asylum determinations. Distinguishing
between adjudicatory and legislative facts assists the adjudicator in
determining which facts require additional scrutiny before making a
predictive assessment of the danger of persecution for the applicant in the
country of origin. "° In the analysis proposed here, the credibility of a source
accords presumptive evidentiary reliability only to legislative facts such as
reports of specific incidents of human rights abuses or political events."'
Additional evaluation of adjudicatory facts (e.g., sweeping generalizations
about the threat posed by a guerrilla group or the reasonableness of an
applicant's fear in light of a current democratic regime) is required before
reliance upon them is warranted.
2. Explicitly evaluate the evidentiary reliability of adjudicatory facts
regarding country conditions.
Adjudicatory facts that make broad generalizations or sweeping
conclusions about country conditions are most vulnerable to bias. The
evidentiary reliability of such facts must be evaluated against what is known
about the country of origin from legislative facts in the record. A recent
decision by the Canadian Immigration Appeals Division (the Division), the
functional equivalent of the BIA, illustrates the nature of such an
evaluation."' The Division explicitly assessed the evidentiary reliability of
generalizations and conclusions drawn by human rights reports." 2 Significant
to its analysis was the degree to which such statements were supported by
specific information in the record as a whole, and the degree to which the
109. See supra Part 11.
110. Extending presumptive evidentiary reliability to legislative facts from those organizations relied
on by the State Department and the INS Resource Information Center for human rights and country
conditions information would allow adjudicators to identify credible nongovernmental sources efficiently,
while maintaining deference to the expertise of government entities whose business it is to provide such
information. See, e.g., ANKER, supra note 1, at Ill n.129 (noting that the INS and its Resource
Information Center consider sources like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyer's
Committee for Human Rights as credible as the State Department or U.N. Special Rapporteur). Challenges
to this presumption or assessing the reliability of information from other sources could be based on what
is known about valid methods of producing the kind of document or type of information in question. For
example, before accepting a particular human rights report as reliable evidence, the Canadian Immigration
Appeals Division considered whether the reporting organization followed methodologies recognized by
scholarly literature and expert testimony. See Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Nos.
M96-10465, M96-10466 (Immigration and Refugee Board (Appeal Division) of Canada, Nov. 6, 1998).
1ll. See Mugesera, supra note I 10.
112. See id. at 36-45.
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source acknowledged the possible limitations of its own conclusions (e.g.,
lack of access to certain territories or groups)." 3 The Division accepted
generalizations that were well-supported by specific facts and conclusions
that had been reasonably qualified by the issuing agency." 4 Unqualified
conclusory statements, however, were rejected." 5  A similar evaluative
process should be incorporated into asylum determinations by Us and the BIA
to ensure that the information used in administrative decision-making is
trustworthy.
3. Discuss the "on the ground" implications of all reliable facts about
the country of origin for the individual applicant's situation.
Formal structures, particular national leaders, and "on the books" policies
do not necessarily provide an accurate reflection of the actual "on the ground"
conditions under which people live in different segments of a given society. "6
Excessive reliance on formal conditions for decision-making "oversimplifies
the complex trajectory of transitions from dictatorship to democracy" in
transitional countries generally ignores that "[t]he subordination of particular
groups often depends less on formal government action than a complex
network of practices and institutions, shaped by all-pervasive influences and
convictions," none of which are effectively neutralized by "official faces,
laws, and policy.""' 7
Thus, the informed prediction about the danger an applicant might face
if returned to the country of origin requires the adjudicator to consider what
country conditions information reveals about "on the ground" practices that
113. See id. at43.
114. See id. at 44-45.
115. See id. at43.
116. See In re Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (B.I.A. 1989) (distinguishing between governmental
formalities and the underlying human rights conditions in a country of origin); ANKER, supra note I, at
144-45 (emphasizing that changes alleviating one form of abuse may give rise to new forms of persecution,
new changes may stir up old animosities between factions, and nongovernmental persecutors may continue
to operate regardless of government formalities); Strandburg, supra note 30, at 61 (emphasizing that
adjudicators cannot assume formal policies and government structures are uniformly effective throughout
all sectors of society).
117. Margulies, supra note 4, at 21-22 (internal citations omitted). See, e.g.,In reR-, 201. & N. Dec.
621, 630-31 (B.I.A. 1992) (Dunne, Bd. Member, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing the
majority for assuming that the democratic nature of the Indian government eliminated a Sikh applicant's
reasonable fear despite State Department reports that similarly situated persons had been killed).
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relate to the individual's situation.'18 Such a determination is necessarily a
fact-specific, case-by-case determination." 9 However, the individualized
determination will be more reasonably grounded in the record if the
adjudicator rigorously compares supportive and countervailing information
about country conditions factors that are closely linked with the persecution
risk generally. 2 Among these factors are: (I) the fundamental nature of the
country of origin's power structure, including its history and relative stability;
(2) the extent to which political participation is encouraged or allowed for
diverse segments of the society; (3) how dissent is responded to at national,
regional, and local levels; and (4) what specific incidents of persecution are
known to have occurred, and how those incidents have been responded to at
national, regional, and local levels.' With country conditions so analyzed,
the adjudicator is in a better position to determine whether a reasonable
person with the applicant's experiences faces at least a fair possibility of
persecution.'22
Accounting for the nature of the information relied upon, and its relation
to the record as a whole, would ensure that eligibility denials are supported
by an explicit discussion of the specifics of the applicant's situation relative
to conclusions about country conditions. Thus, the record would reflect
greater clarity as to how "reasonable fear" was assessed and whether the
appropriate presumptions and burdens of proof were applied. The resulting
particularized findings would create an administrative record that is adequate
i18. See In re E-P-, Interim Dec. 3311,1997 WL 123905 at *6 (B.I.A. Mar. 14,1997) (Schmidt, Bd.
Chairman, dissenting) (emphasizing that general country conditions must be connected to the specific
conditions giving rise to the individual's fear); ANKER, supra note 1, at 141 (discussing how "adjudicators
should not make broad judgments about changed circumstances without relating those changes to the
applicant's specific circumstances").
119. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,448 (1987).
120. See ANKER, supra note1, at 137-50; Margulies, supra note 4, at 28; Strandburg, supra note 30,
at 60.
121. See sources cited supra note 120.
122. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (indicating that a one in ten chance of persecution could
establish reasonable fear); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (1999) (requiring the applicant to demonstrate a
"reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he or she were to return ... or avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country"). See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)
(emphasizing that the basis of administrative action "must be set forth with such clarity as to be
understandable").
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for meaningful judicial review. 123
B. Judicial Reform
Judicial review of administrative determinations does not allow the court
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.'24 However, the role of the
court is "to act as both supervisor and partner of the administrative agencies
in furtherance of the public interest,"'25 and to intervene when the record
reflects unfairness."26 The federal judiciary abdicates this responsibility when
it allows "deference" to become perfunctory "rubber stamping" of
administrative decisions.127 Moreover, the international obligations and
humanitarian aims of asylum law indicate "no reason to treat the [BIA] as a
unique kind of administrative agency entitled to extreme deference"' 28 in
which the asylum-seeker is forced to show that only one possible conclusion
could be drawn from the evidence. A standard of review that requires asylum
determinations to be reasonably grounded on substantial evidence, as related
to the record as a whole, would not result in the federal courts of appeals
reweighing evidence or resolving factual disputes.'29 Rather, such a standard
would allow the courts to verify that the administrative agency has engaged
in neutral factfinding and applied appropriate evidentiary protections.3 '
Thus, a return to a "substantial evidence" standard, as interpreted by normal
administrative law principles, is warranted.
A decision is not supported by substantial evidence if it rests on "faulty
assumptions or factual foundations."'' With regard to country conditions
123. See Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) (arguing that "the need for clear
administrative findings is implicit" in asylum law); Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 999 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding under the substantial evidence standard that "the reviewing court will not supply a reasoned basis
for agency action that the agency itself did not articulate"). See also cases cited supra note 122.
124. See STEIN, ET AL, supra note 89, § 51.01[2], at 51-79 to 51-81.
125. Id., § 51.01 [2), at 51-87.
126. See 8 GoRDON ET AL., supra note 25, § 104.07[2), at 104-95.
127. See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
128. Ghebllawi v. INS, 28 F.3d 83, 85 (9th Cir. 1994). But see Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that Elias-Zacarias' construction of the substantial evidence standard was the definitive
interpretation of the standard of review for BIA fact findings).
129. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,491 (1951); Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d
482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994).
130. See Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1089 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
131. Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass'n v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157, 1160(11th Cir. 1994) (differentiating the
"substantial evidence" review from the less deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard and the more
stringent "preponderance of the evidence test").
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evidence, a denial of eligibility could be deemed to rest on a faulty
assumption if the adjudicator gave dispositive weight to evidence of formal
aspects of a country of origin's government without analyzing its "on the
ground" practices. 3 ' Similarly, the factual foundation for a denial of
eligibility would be faulty where the nature of individual facts has been
misapprehended (e.g., where conclusory statements or broad generalizations
have been relied on without rigorous comparisons of specific supportive and
countervailing information to assess their evidentiary reliability).'33 In both
instances, the agency fails to provide a well-reasoned basis for finding why
an applicant did not demonstrate a "reasonable possibility of suffering such
persecution if he or she were to return... or avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country[.]"' 34 Thus, such denials of asylum eligibility are
not supported by substantial evidence and the courts should be responsible for
remanding the case for correction.'35 Anything less would effectively raise
the applicant's burden of proof or undermine the credibility of the process by
an appearance of arbitrariness.'36
CONCLUSION
Selective use of decontextualized country conditions information in
asylum determinations distorts the adjudicatory process, undermines respect
for the fairness of decision-makers, and increases the risk that asylum will be
denied in violation of international obligations. To remedy this situation,
administrative adjudicators must account for both the nature and context of
132. See Margulies, supra note 4, at 17 (arguing that the practice of "citing the results of single
elections or changes in law 'on the books' as proof that refugees have nothing to fear" to defeat an
otherwise valid claim represents a demise of U.S. commitment to the protections of refugees).
133. See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488 ("The substantiality of evidence must take into
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight."). See also discussion supra Part III.A.2.
134. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (2000).
135. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (noting that remand
is the preferred course when the administrative agency fails to offer legally sufficient reasons for its
decision); See generally, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 393 U.S. 87 (1968)
(holding that deference to the discretion an agency is entitled to is not a substitute for evidence in the
record).
136. See e.g., Marguiles, supra note 4, at 36-40 (arguing that explicit factfinding regarding changed
country conditions is necessary to preserve an applicant's low burden of proof); see also Martin, supra note
36, at 1280-85 (emphasizing the relationship between the process by which asylum decisions are made and
the perceived fairness of decision-makers).
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country conditions information used. Additionally, decisions to deny asylum
must be supported by a detailed analysis of the "on the ground" implications
of country conditions information for an individual applicant's situation.
Moreover, the federal courts of appeals must play an active role in evaluating
the factual foundation for the agency's decisions to ensure that asylum
applicants are not made to prove more than the law requires.
